SAN FRANCISCO (Legal Newsline) - A sex-abuse trial involving a school teacher that was halted after several days can only resume after the judge makes a more thorough determination of whether the plaintiff can be asked about a subsequent episode of abuse, California’s highest court ruled.
The plaintiff identified as Jane Doe sued Mountain View School District over claims she suffered physical and emotional distress after being abused by former teacher Joseph Baldenebro when she was less than 10 years old. The school district moved to introduce evidence Doe had subsequently been sexually abused by a family friend and that episode might have contributed to her injuries.
The trial judge ruled the testimony would be allowed. After both sides referred to the second molestation in their opening statements, the California Supreme Court halted the trial and ordered the appeals court to decide whether the evidence was admissible. The appeals court said it was, but the California Supreme Court reversed in a July 27 decision.
Doe claims she suffered extensive physical and emotional damages, which she “began to discover” in 2016. But during discovery the school district learned Doe had been abused by a family friend in 2013, an event she didn’t mention when she first reported Badenebro’s conduct to the police.
California Evidence Code Section 1106 prohibits defendants from introducing evidence about a plaintiff’s sexual conduct unless it is allowed under Section 783, which governs the admissibility of evidence in civil sex-abuse cases. Doe moved to block any mention of the 2013 incident but the trial judge decided Section 783 only applies to voluntary sexual conduct and the school district could cite the prior abuse as a possible contributing factor to her injuries.
Doe’s lawyers immediately appealed the decision but the Second District affirmed. Her lawyers then sought review by the California Supreme Court, which stayed the trial after three days. After that, both sides agreed Sections 1106 and 783 encompassed voluntary and involuntary sexual activity, so the only question was whether the evidence should be allowed.
Under the old law, rape defendants could bring up the plaintiff’s sexual history, with a 1931 Supreme Court decision stating: “It is certainly more probable that a woman who has [had sex] voluntarily in the past would be much more likely to consent, than one whose past reputation was without blemish, and whose personal conduct could not truthfully be assailed.
Legislators amended the criminal code in 1981 and the civil code in 1985. Under the new rules, courts can allow evidence of sexual activity only after a hearing out of the presence of the jury and if the judge determines the evidence is relevant to undercut the credibility of the plaintiff. An appellate court addressed this very question, ruling that “evidence of emotional distress involuntarily inflicted by others” is relevant to impeach a plaintiff’s testimony about the damage the defendant caused.
In this case, however, the trial judge didn’t conduct a thorough enough hearing about whether the testimony would be relevant, including asking the plaintiff whether 100 percent of her emotional distress was caused by the teacher. The trial court also failed to write an order stating exactly what evidence the defendant can introduce and questions to be asked.
“We expect the trial court to engage in the structured focusing and narrowing contemplated by section 783, and, if after further consideration it allows evidence concerning the 2013 molestation, to specify what evidence may be introduced and what questions may be asked, thus clarifying what may be presented to the jury,” the high court concluded.