AUSTIN, Texas (Legal Newsline) - There was no reason to order a new trial in a lawsuit over a beer-fueled accident involving car dealership employees that resulted in a $4 million verdict neither side was happy with, the Texas Supreme Court ruled.
The fact an expert referred to the accident victim’s drinking habit wasn’t enough to assume the jury ignored the trial judge’s instructions to disregard hearsay evidence, the high court said.
Irma Villegas was an employee at Rudolph Mazda when her sales manager, Marcelo Flores, decided to reward workers after a week of 11-hour days in December 2013 by providing beer to celebrate. After the party, Villegas was struck and seriously injured by another employee’s truck while walking to her car. She was confined to a nursing home and died in 2020.
Villegas’ daughter, Andrea Juarez, sued Rudolph and several employees for negligence, failure to train and premises liability. After a three-week trial, the jury awarded more than $4 million in damages in a fractured verdict that relieved Rudolph of liability but nevertheless apportioned the dealership 10% of the damages. The plaintiff also complained that the last witness for the defense, toxicologist Dr. Gary Wimbish, referred to Villegas’ habit of drinking on the job and to help herself sleep despite the judge’s pretrial order not to discuss the victim’s drinking before the party at the dealership.
The judge told the jury to disregard Wimbish’s testimony as inadmissible hearsay, but then ordered a new trial after the verdict because “the harm could not be eliminated or removed.”
An appeals court upheld the order for a new trial but the Texas Supreme Court, in a June 16 decision, reversed. New-trial orders are “strong medicine” that should be administered only in extreme cases, the court said.
“The presumption that jurors follow curative instructions—forceful ones like this especially—is not a featherweight to be disregarded without some powerful reason,” the court said in a lengthy opinion. “Perfection is not the standard a trial or appellate court could reasonably demand. Our system of jury trials would break down if the kind of cure supplied here were not usually sufficient.”
In his testimony, Dr. Winbish said “in the information that I have received, (Villegas) brings alcohol with her to work, and . . . had been drinking out of her cup on her own supply of alcohol that day.” He admitted that he didn’t remember “the exact person” who told him.
“I’m not being derogatory. I’m just trying to say this is information that I considered. Okay? She verified in her statement she may have a problem with alcohol because having to wake up in the middle of the night and drink alcohol so she can go back to sleep,” the toxicologist testified.
The plaintiff’s lawyer asked to approach the bench and immediately requested a mistrial. The judge rejected it, instead telling the jury “you heard testimony from the witness that is not credible, is unreliable, and not evidence in this case.” The judge nevertheless ordered a new trial after the verdict came in, concluding “the harm could not be eliminated or removed.”
The Supreme Court disagreed, citing other decisions involving closing arguments.
“Repeatedly telling jurors that they would align themselves with Nazis if they ruled for the defense could not have been cured; urging a jury to send a message responding to too-low verdicts could have been,” the court said. “If the curative instruction here could not cure the effect of Wimbish’s ill-chosen sentences, then nothing could.”
Before the Texas Supreme Court addressed the question in a 2009 decision, judges could order a new trial “without any realistic chance of review.” Then, relying upon the Texas Constitution’s statement that the right to trial “shall remain inviolate,” the Supreme Court said it is an abuse of discretion to order a new trial without stating “an understandable, reasonably specific reason.”
“Orders that provide no basis for the parties and appellate courts to confirm that the court’s determination was the result of careful assessment of the actual evidence in the case are conclusory,” the high court said.
The court also rejected plaintiff arguments a new trial was needed because the jury awarded no damages for Villegas’ past and future suffering and her daughter’s past loss of consortium. The jury was free to award noneconomic damages as it saw fit, the Supreme Court said, especially since pain and suffering awards for past and future damages can overlap. The judge can only intervene if the jury “has clearly departed from its function as a rational factfinder.”