LOS ANGELES (Legal Newsline) - A woman who sued a Los Angeles school district over sexual abuse she suffered from her fourth-grade teacher can be required to provide evidence about subsequent abuse she suffered as a teenager, a California appeals court ruled.
Acknowledging deep tension between a law designed to protect abuse victims from being questioned about irrelevant sexual conduct and another one designed to allow defendants to present evidence reducing their liability, the Second Appellate District ruled that evidence of involuntary sexual abuse can be introduced if the court observes the proper safeguards.
The Oct. 29 decision followed an order by the California Supreme Court to halt the proceedings in the lawsuit so that the appeals court could consider the plaintiff’s objection to a trial judge’s ruling allowing Mountain View School District to use evidence of the subsequent molestation to reduce the amount of damages it owes for her abuse in elementary school.
A plaintiff identified as Jane Doe sued Mountain View, accusing the school of negligently supervising a teacher who molested her in 2010 and 2011. The school district sought to introduce evidence Doe had also been abused in 2013 and had undergone years of therapy to address the effects of the second episode.
The district court ruled that Section 1106 of California’s Evidence Code, which prohibits introducing evidence of “plaintiff’s sexual conduct” in sexual harassment, abuse and assault lawsuits only applied to voluntary conduct. Complicating the analysis, Section 1106 carves out exceptions for introducing evidence to attack the plaintiff’s credibility under Section 783 of the code. That section and another related one require judges to conduct a hearing and weigh the relevance of the evidence before allowing it in.
Faced with the judge’s ruling, the plaintiff’s lawyer acknowledged the second attack in opening arguments. The appeals court rejected Mountain View’s argument the plaintiff waived any objection at that point, calling the admission “a tactically reasonable response to try to make the best of the trial court’s adverse ruling by `fronting’ evidence that would be devastating if it first came from the opposing side.”
The appeals court also ruled that interpreting “plaintiff’s sexual conduct” to include voluntary and involuntary conduct ”is most consonant with legislative intent.” The legislature was trying to exclude evidence of promiscuity and protect the plaintiff’s right to privacy, the court said. Excluding involuntary activity “would lead to absurd results,” the court ruled, including allowing in evidence of activity by people under the age of 14, who are not legally able to give consent. Precedent in California and other states supports this reasoning, the court concluded.
The appeals court acknowledged tension between the absolute bar in 1106 and the case-by-case analysis ordered by Section 783 but concluded the legislature “made its intent clear” and evidence of prior sexual conduct, voluntary or involuntary, can’t be admitted under Section 1106.
That wasn’t the end of the story, however. Since 1106 includes the exception citing 783, the court concluded, judges can still allow in evidence of the plaintiff’s sexual conduct, voluntary or involuntary, on a case-by-case basis if all the safeguards are observed. While the judge made some errors, the court concluded, the basic decision allowing evidence of the plaintiff’s subsequent abuse wasn’t an abuse of discretion.
The court ordered the trial judge to consider again whether it was appropriate to allow the jury to hear the evidence in this case, and if the jury had been dismissed, order a new trial.